History shows us that attempts to fix exchange rates or create Essay

History shows us that attempts to fix exchange rates or create monetary unions between different countries usually end in failur - Essay Example While there are certainly several similarities between these experiences, the European experiment must be viewed in its broader political and administrative context to see that such pessimism is not entirely warranted. The failure of monetary cooperation was partly due to the loss of autonomy countries face when they agree to fix exchange rates or participate in a union. This loss of autonomy means that a country has fewer tools at its disposal to reach its internal and external balance. Different countries define the term â€Å"balance† differently with respect to their internal and external balance goals – for instance, the German Bundesbank has historically been considered very inflation-averse, while the central bank of Italy has generally seemed comfortable with higher inflation rates1. In normal economic times, this divergence in goals is not a problem and countries find their fiscal tools sufficient to address short- and medium- term deviations from their interna l and external balance goals. In times of crises, however, countries with a lower tolerance for deviation from goals may find that they require more than just their fiscal tools to address the crisis. This is particularly true under fixed exchange rate regimes. When a country is facing unemployment, in addition to fiscal measures, monetary authorities might want to stimulate investment by increasing the money supply and lowering interest rates. However, the Mundell-Fleming model shows us that under a fixed exchange rate regime (unless the nation imposes restrictions on capital mobility, such as China did until recently)2, such a move would be ineffective because a lower interest rate would cause a capital outflow, which in turn would apply depreciating pressures on the domestic currency. To maintain the exchange rate, the central bank would then be obliged to buy back the very same currency that it initially supplied to the economy to encourage investment.3 Where the costs are deeme d to outweigh the benefits, countries are left with three options: (i) Continue to remain within the arrangement, but act autonomously (ii) Continue to remain within the arrangement, but renegotiate the terms to address the crisis, or (iii) Cease to remain within the arrangement Examples of these options being exercised are numerous. For example, under the Gold Standard, which was a fixed exchange regime between 1870 and 1914, central banks were required to adhere to the â€Å"rules of the game,† when there were disturbances in the price-specie flow mechanism that held the Gold Standard in place4. These â€Å"rules† meant that central banks would sell domestic assets while experiencing a current account deficit and buy domestic assets while experiencing a surplus. However, the urgency to bring about an external balance was felt more sharply by countries facing deficits, so countries often exercised the first option - which meant that the â€Å"rules† were freque ntly violated or ignored5 although to all appearances, the system was not overthrown. The second option, often takes a form that either returns a degree of autonomy to the member countries or enhances the power of a third body to address the crisis. Examples of the second option being exercised can be found in both the history of the Bretton Woods System as well as the European Monetary System (EMS). Under the Bretton Woods System, countries were required to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar while